Ego and Self in Gestalt Theory by Stemberger, Gerhard
Original Contributions - Originalbeiträge
Gerhard Stemberger1
Ego and Self in Gestalt Theory
“The genesis of an Ego...”
“… the genesis of an Ego is one of the strangest and most remarkable of 
phenomena which, it would appear, is also controlled by whole-processes”, 
Max Wertheimer, the founder of Gestalt theory, once observed (Wertheimer, 
1924 in 1944, 90).
And indeed, hardly anyone ponders in daily life or pays attention to in other 
ways, whether or not there might be such a thing as an ego. In our lives it is just 
there either a matter of course, or as an implicit point of reference for the spatial 
coordinates “in front of me,” “next to me,” “behind me”—or sometimes it is not 
there at all.
There are situations in which the ego is “everything”—where about in the raging 
pain, hardly another world exists besides the ego. There are situations where the 
ego spatially expands and subsumes otherwise in separated areas of the environ-
ment, such as the clothing, the car, sporting equipment, and again other situa-
tions in which it involuntarily or voluntarily dwindles away, possibly shrinks to 
a small point, or in extreme cases, becomes disembodied. At times the ego is the 
center of its world, then again marginal, sometimes it functions as a member of 
a larger whole, such as in a team sport or in a well-coordinated working group, 
then again there are situations where another person serves as an “extension” of 
one’s will, or even as an extension of one’s ego.2
Everyday experience already shows that the ego is not a solid, more or less steady 
“object,” but something very mutable in many ways. Our life would obviously 
1  The article is loosely based on the lecture “The Phenomenal Ego and its World” at the Symposium 
“100 Years of Gestalt Psychology” in Helsinki, 28.-29.9.2012. I thank Ed Ragsdale, Ian Verstegen, and Michael 
Wertheimer for reviewing the drafts and for encouraging its publication. The remaining deficiencies remain my 
responsibility.
2  The whole variety of relevant Gestalt psychological research in this area unfortunately cannot be presented 
here for reasons of space. Some of it should be referred to at least briefly. The work of the German Gestalt 
psychologists Kurt Kohl (1956) and Paul Tholey (1989, 1990, 2018) in sports psychology deserves mention. They 
investigated the “coalescence” of the athlete with the sports equipment (or even with the relevant environment, 
such as the ski slope) and to the inclusion of the self in a structured We in team sports. Furthermore, the lucid 
dream research of Paul Tholey (2018) and others have contributed extensively to a differentiated understanding 
of the phenomenal self. The work of the German Gestalt psychologist Edwin Rausch on the perception of 
paintings (Rausch, 1982) gave the impetus to the development of the multiple-field approach in Gestalt 
Theoretical Psychotherapy (cf. Stemberger 2009, 2018, 2021).
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not be possible at all without this high plasticity and constant changeability of the 
ego in a flow of constantly changing situations and their demands.
Our ego may be experienced, or it may be functionally present without being ex-
perienced. It may take center stage or may take a very marginal place in our phe-
nomenal world. Sometimes it may also assume quite different functional roles in 
the phenomenal world—perhaps subordinated as part of a larger whole, acting as 
a specific limb for some complex activity, or in the role of a subordinate element 
in a collective action, or fully identified with a purpose itself, or even dissolve in 
the demands of a specific situation. It may vary in its permeability with respect 
to its phenomenal world. It may vary in the extent and strength of the internal 
differentiation of its inner “regions” or “layers,” which may also vary in their level 
of interaction with each other and with the phenomenal environment: It consists 
of manifold dynamic internal and external interactions and thus finely regulates 
its internal life, and likewise its relations with the phenomenal environment, es-
pecially also with the fellow human beings. Its energy level and state of tension 
will vary in accordance with its specific objectives. Under certain conditions the 
ego may double or multiply, with each of these phenomenal egos having its own 
phenomenal environment—just think of “daydreaming” or a visit to the cinema, 
in which you may be “drawn” into the thrilling movie action with the result that 
you (your first ego) can sit in your seat in the auditorium (the environment of 
your first ego) on the one hand as the moviegoer, and on the other hand you 
(your second ego) simultaneously live and act as the adventurer in a completely 
different world (the environment of the second ego).
Any changes in that area of the phenomenal field that forms our phenomenal 
ego, inevitably results in corresponding changes in the field of its phenomenal 
environment—and vice versa—in an unceasing dynamic interrelationship. If the 
ego is central, its environment would be peripheral and vice versa. If it expands, its 
phenomenal environment would shrink and vice versa. The tensions of its needs 
and intentions lead to specific changes in its experienced environment while vice 
versa the occurrence of corresponding issues in his experienced environment pro-
vides opportunities and impetus for relaxation or “transformation” of its needs. 
Changes of its world can originate, at times, due to the ego’s activity, or at other 
times, without its active involvement. And in all of this, the phenomenal processes 
are intimately intertwined via action and “feedback” with the physiological orga-
nism and its physical environment, including the other people and organisms in it.
1. Early Gestalt Psychology Contributions
The dynamic variability of the phenomenal ego and its phenomenal environment, 
as well as the terms of their relative phenomenal constancy and the way they 
interact with the rest of the physical world, have been subjects of discussion in 
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Gestalt theory dating from the early work of its founders.3 I would like to refer 
to three of these early contributions first—already these show that Gestalt theory 
was from the very beginning an approach that anticipated all the important 
moments of today’s debate in cognitive science about embodied, embedded, 
extended, and enactive cognition (the “4E cognition”) with original approaches 
that deserve more attention.
As a first reference for this I mention the explanation of the genesis and cure of 
a case of paranoid disorder, given by the German psychiatrist Heinrich Schulte 
inspired by Max Wertheimer4 (Schulte, 1924 in 1986): In this case an ego, 
experiencing itself as completely segregated from the others and suffering from 
this situation in an intolerable manner, manages to get into the very center of the 
situation and into a strong relationship with the group through a radical paranoid 
restructuring of the situation as this ego perceives it.
As a second reference, I will address the Berlin experimental program of 
“Investigations in the Psychology of Action and Emotion” (1926–1937) of Kurt 
Lewin and his students: Here the mental tension systems and the structure and 
dynamics of the ego-environment division are at the center of diverse experiments 
on laws governing human behavior.5
For a third example, we will take a closer look at Kurt Koffka’s Gestalt theory of 
the ego, the first and most systematic early treatment of the subject from a Gestalt 
theoretical perspective (in Koffka’s “Principles” 1935).
2. Disturbances in the Ego-World Relationship
Sometimes, unexpected disturbances of usual processes and situations reveal their 
otherwise unnoticed dynamic order and functioning in ordinary life. Therefore 
(and also because in my field, psychotherapy, we are mostly confronted with 
disturbances and their painful consequences) let me start with some examples of 
such disturbances in the relationship of the ego and its world. As the following 
examples show, the disturbance can take its origin from a functionally inappro-
priate positioning of the ego in its world, or from an inappropriate fusion of 
the ego with parts of its world, or from an either too high or too low reciprocal 
permeability of the environment regions and the ego-regions, or the disorder 
3  Some of the terminological and conceptual differences in the consideration of ego and self among the 
founders of Gestalt psychology, not covered in this paper, are discussed by A.S. Luchins 1961.
4  Wertheimer’s assistant and collaborator Erwin Levy: “The author in fact was Max Wertheimer, who years 
later told me that he had outlined the theory to Dr. Schulte, who was to work it out in final form.” Levy 1986, 
230. We therefore speak of the “Schulte/Wertheimer these.”
5  For an overview see Lewin’s “Survey of Experimental Investigations,” Lewin 1935, 239–273; the translation 
and discussion of some of these studies can be found in De Rivera 1976; for a discussion of the further 
continuation of this approach, see Lindorfer 2021.
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may manifest itself in a problematic interrelation between simultaneously exis-
ting multiple phenomenal worlds. These four cases probably contain the most 
important constellations according to clinical experience; nevertheless there is no 
reason to regard the list as conclusive.
Let me now give you four examples of how these constellations can practically 
manifest themselves in certain life difficulties and mental disorders:
1. Problems arising from inappropriate positioning of the ego in its world: 
As already mentioned, the paranoid delusions are understood by Schulte/
Wertheimer as a disturbed Ego-We-organization. In this case (Schulte, 1924 
in 1986), a Tatar war prisoner in WW I finds himself in an unbearable 
marginal position excluded from the We of the other war prisoners because 
nobody understands his language and he does not understand the others. 
As a prisoner, he cannot escape from this unbearable situation. A process of 
restructuring the situation—as he experiences it—sets in for him. The Tatar 
prisoner finally perceives himself in the very center of the situation as being 
the person persecuted by all the others. This is by no means a comfortable 
solution for him but one which is more bearable than being completely cut 
off from the others in a situation which demands so strongly a We-affiliation 
of some kind. This mental restructuring of the situation comprises not 
only a change of locus of the ego in its phenomenal world, but also a total 
reorganization of all the functional relations in the environmental field.
2. Problems arising from a boundary violating, in extreme cases even abusive 
behavior of a person, who perceives other people as an extension of its own 
ego: Such a person has “incorporated” the other, made him a part of its own 
ego, or uses the other as a “continuation” or “extension” of its own ego, for 
example, as a mere tool. Here an expansion of the ego, incorporating other 
persons, combines with a corresponding functional rearrangement of the com-
plete phenomenal field, which is perceived as being structured entirely in the 
service of its own immediate interests. Such inclusion of the other in one’s 
own person need not be linked to a negative, abusive context, but is in other 
situations a completely normal, functionally demanded and useful process. 
Koffka mentioned, for example, the initial inclusion of the infant in the ego 
of the mother, as indicated by her tendency to react in the same way regardless 
of whether she herself or her child is placed in a particular situation. This ini-
tially is a perfectly sensible and functional structural characteristic of the field, 
however, it may become problematic and conflictual to the extent that the 
mother’s incorporation of her child as part of herself comes to clash with the 
child’s own growing independence. Similar constellations can be observed in 
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intimate personal relationships of adults, but also in all other areas of working, 
social, and political life, in both positive and negative manifestations.
3. Disturbances of the functional relationship between parts of the phe-
nomenal field: Stuttering is usually associated with a specific disorder of the 
whole-relationship in the phenomenal world: fluency of speech requires that 
the attention is focused on the other and on the relationship to this other 
and not on the technical process of speaking or even on the organs of speech 
(see Figures 1 and 2). Again, we are dealing here with a restructuring of the 
phenomenal world, in which the functionally meaningful relationships be-
tween the parts and the whole in the field are disturbed.
4. Disturbances in the relationship of multiple total fields: The research of 
Gestalt psychologist Edwin Rausch has shown (Rausch, 1982), that under 
certain conditions the ego-environment-structure of the phenomenal field 
differentiates further and a second phenomenal ego segregates with a second 
phenomenal world, for instance in “daydreaming,” mental sports training, 
“mind wandering,” and similar processes (Stemberger, 2009, 2018, 2021). 
The interrelationship between these two total fields can have a constructive 
effect (for example for problem solving) but can also be part of a problematic 
process. Eating disorders, for example, are understood by Thomas Fuchs as 
solidifying the segregation of a second phenomenal total field with a second 
phenomenal ego to maintain a livable balance in an otherwise difficult or 
even unbearable situation (see Fuchs, 2010, 2021).
Figs. 1 and 2. The situation of stuttering: fluent speech requires that the focus of attention is on 
the other person and the relationship to him (Figure 1) and not on the speech process or even on 
the speech organs (Figure 2). (GSt after a screenshot from the movie “The King’s Speech”).
3. The Basic Position of Critical Realism
The Gestalt theoretical conception of a close correlation between an ever-adapting 
phenomenal world and an equally variable ego, is closely related to the epistemo-
logical core position of Gestalt theory, critical realism: 
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According to this basic position, first formulated by Köhler, 1929 (see Figure 3), 
it is necessary to clearly distinguish between, on the one hand, (a) the phenome-
nal world, encountered in experience (with a phenomenal bodily ego segregated 
within this phenomenal world), and on the other hand, (b) the transphenomenal 
world, including the physiological organism within his physical environment.6
Fig. 3. Schema of ego-environment relations (after Köhler, 1929), in the graphic representation 
of Metzger 1941/2001, 283, in English in Metzger 1972, 244. Relationship between physical world 
including physiological organism (= Macrocosm) and phenomenal-perceptual world including 
experienced bodily Ego (= Microcosm). 1 = physical environment of organism; 1’ = physical object, 
reflecting light rays; 2 = physiological organism, as part of the physical world; 3 = apparent (perceived) 
environment of bodily Ego; 3’ = apparent (distal) object or percept, representing the physical object; 
4 = bodily Ego, as part of the phenomenal-perceptual world, representing the organism.
The physiological organism and its physical environment provide via nervous 
and brain processes the material basis for the phenomenal world of each person. 
Between the both worlds, the transphenomenal and the phenomenal, constant 
coordination processes take place that are needed for life and survival of the hu-
man being in its physical environment. The person can experience some of the 
workings and effects of this transphenomenal side of his existence in his pheno-
menal world but has no immediate experiential access to it.
The phenomenal world of each person is a microcosm within the macrocosm of 
the physical world. These microcosms are part of the physical macrocosm but 
have specific features—phenomenal and dynamic qualities whereas other parts of 
the physical world do not have. Gestalt theory holds that the phenomenal world 
is in fact not just a more or less good and veridical “image” of the physical world 
but possesses the dynamic characteristics of a field. This field is mainly organized 
by the needs and quasi-needs of the phenomenal ego on one hand, the attractive 
6  In Koffka’s terminology this is the differentiation of “geographical world” and “behavioural world.” (Koffka, 
1935, 40 ff) Cf. Sternek 2021 for a more detailed account of critical realism.
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and repulsive qualities in its phenomenal environment on the other. The facts 
appearing and occurring in the phenomenal world stand are not unrelated to 
each other, but are in close dynamic (field-like) interaction with each other. They 
are not neutral but are experienced as attractive or repulsive and organize accor-
ding to the given total field situation and the constant cybernetic interaction of 
the phenomenal world with the organism and its physical environment, their 
constant influences and feedback (cf. Metzger 1965/1986; Metzger 1972). It is 
this peculiarity which makes the phenomenal world apt to function as the “cen-
tral steering mechanism” of the human organism in its physical environment and 
along the same path to interaction with other humans which interact in the same 
way from their microcosms with the common physical environment.
4. A Model of “Super-Veridical Representation”
At this point, a brief side glance at the debate in the cognitive sciences is allowed 
regarding whether representationalist models or non-representationalist models 
do better justice to the human cognitive process. In my opinion, such confronta-
tions have not proved fruitful (cf. Verstegen, 2012). With its critical realist model 
Gestalt theory offers an alternative. It assumes that a man with his phenomenal 
world has at his disposal an embodied microcosm which not only represents ve-
ridically to an astonishingly high degree the part of the macrocosm surrounding 
him which is relevant for him in his given life situation but can do much more. 
It can not only represent its macro-physical environment like a veridical picture 
or film recording, it can do beyond that what no film camera of the world can 
do: It can create a representation of this world in constant flux, in which not only 
this world, but simultaneously also his own relationship to this world and the dy-
namic development of this relationship is represented in constant interaction. In 
this sense the microcosm of man is not only veridical, it is super-veridical, insofar 
as it is able to represent veridically not only the objects surrounding man and the 
influence of his actions on these objects, but beyond that also his personal dy-
namic relation to these objects (including the most significant “objects” for him, 
his fellow people). Only this super-veridicality enables this microcosm to serve 
as a steering organ for man’s experience and behavior in the macrocosm, which 
surrounds him and of which he is an active part.
5. The “Central Steering Mechanism”
I adopt here the term “Central Steering Mechanism” from Wolfgang Metzger.7 In 
1969 he asked the question:
7  Lewin 1935 has already pointed out the steering role of the perceptual field, referring to Köhler, 1922; 
Lewin & Sakuma, 1925: “Thus there occurs a steering of the process by the perceptual field.” (Lewin, 1935, 48) 
Metzger, however, deserves credit for having elaborated this idea conceptually in a systematic way.
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“What is the use of this duplication of the world into a physical and a 
perceptive one, of the person into an organism and a bodily ego, of stimu-
lation into configurations of physico-chemical impacts upon receptors and 
valences affecting the ego, and of reaction into intended changes of the 
bodily ego and motions executed by parts of the organism? What relevance 
can all this have? It is extremely improbable that so highly complicated an 
organization could have developed during evolution and preserved wit-
hout a considerable survival value.” (Metzger, 1972, 247).
Metzger answered that question as follows:
“The function of the phenomenal world, then, would be to make possi-
ble just those dynamic interactions and to transfer them to the organism 
through an intricate system of circular conductors that allow for the ne-
cessary feedback in such a way that the organism itself is made to behave 
‘with regard to’ the objects encountered in its environment and relevant 
for its survival.” (ibid, 249)
To explain this, Metzger chooses as an example a goal-directed body movement. 
If a person wants to reach for a water glass, the movement of his phenomenal 
hand toward the phenomenal water glass leads to the corresponding movement 
of his respective physiological limb toward the physical object “water glass.” 
Appropriate cybernetic feedback processes control the physiological movement 
and the continuous feedback about the successful coordination between the mo-
vement of the phenomenal hand and the movement of the physiological hand.
“My intention to lift up my right hand, e.g., can only be directed to the 
phenomenal hand as a part of my phenomenal bodily ego but never di-
rectly to the anatomical part of my organism that is related to the former 
and bears the same name.” (ibid, 245) That there are significant differences 
between the experienced arm and the corresponding physiological part of 
the organism, becomes somewhat obvious from the “discrepancy between 
the region of the bodily ego on which our will immediately acts, and the 
region of the organism that, at the same time, is subject to innervation. 
[…] the former region lies unmistakably within the hand itself as a part 
of the bodily ego, whereas the latter just as unmistakably lies within the 
muscular system of the upper arm and the shoulder of the anatomical 
organism.” (ibid, 245)
“The interrelations between the subject and the object, […] become them-
selves a steering mechanism, in which—in the case of attraction—the 
place of the phenomenal object represents the value aimed at, the position 
of the subject the actual value, and consequently the distance between 
them represents the difference between these two values by which the hu-
man steering machine viz. the muscular system is set in motion so that 
in the physical world the distance between the organism and the object 
diminishes and finally disappears.” (ibid, 251)
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Metzger points out the similarity of this steering function to a servomechanism, 
for example the mechanical steering of a large vessel, emphasizes, however, that 
this similarity is limited.
This steering process depends, of course, on whether and how the central nervous 
and peripheral nervous connections required for it between the corresponding 
phenomenal processes and the organism that are active. This is largely not the 
case during sleep, for example, where as a consequence movements of the dream 
body do not lead to corresponding movements of the organism. To a large extent 
this kind of connection is also shut down for those areas of the phenomenal 
world, which have segregated as a second total field of experience with its own 
phenomenal ego, for example during a “daydream.” Metzger mentions also other 
examples where it does not come to such a coupling of phenomenal motions and 
motions of the physiological organism: “in the hallucinations of motion due to 
affections of the brain by psychoses, lesions, or poisoning, as well as in the illusory 
movement of phantom-limbs after amputation.” (ibid, 245)
Of course, Metzger’s example of an arm movement is just a very simple example 
of how the phenomenal world of man acts as a central steering system. Not only 
bodily movements, but the whole maneuvering of man in his environment, 
from the simplest life and species-sustaining activities such as food procurement, 
securing his physical integrity, reproduction, etc., up to the most complex 
interactions in his interpersonal environment would be controlled according 
to this thesis by this kind of interaction between the phenomenal world, its 
organism, and its other physical environment.
Mind you: This steering function is attributed by Metzger to the phenomenal 
world in its entirety—not primarily, or even solely to the phenomenal self within 
this phenomenal world. In this point, Gestalt theory differs significantly from 
many other approaches that deal with the ego and attribute to the ego a much 
“more prominent” role, as does Gestalt theory. To characterize these Gestalt the-
oretical positions, I will sketch now some key ideas of relevant representatives.
6. Max Wertheimer: “Strange and Most Remarkable”
As early as 1924 in his famous lecture “Gestalt theory” before the Kant society 
Max Wertheimer made the following remark—which might sound a bit strange 
for contemporary ears:
“Here I am – the Ego – first a part of the field. I am not fundamentally an 
Ego standing in relief against other Egos, as has usually been maintained; 
no, the genesis of an Ego is one of the strangest and most remarkable of 
phenomena which, it would appear, is also controlled by whole-processes. 
As I have stated, I am a part in this field.” (Wertheimer, 1924 in 1944, 90)
GESTALT THEORY, Vol. 43, No.1
56 Original Contributions - Originalbeiträge
Here, in this early presentation of Gestalt theory, Wertheimer already postulates 
some basic theses, which are characteristic for the Gestalt theoretical conception 
of the ego (later on elaborated in more detail, especially by Koffka):
First: An ego neither exists from the outset in the experience and behavior of humans 
nor does it exist always, but it is formed only under certain conditions. This remark 
does not, or at least not primarily, refers to the developmental process of the genesis 
of an ego-experience in infancy (cf. for this topic Arfelli Galli, 2012). Rather, it states 
also for the adult that an “I versus the others” is experienced only under certain con-
ditions. His ego may, for example, under certain conditions, at least for some time 
dissolve entirely in a group, or forget about himself completely in a specific activity.
And secondly: This ego does not unfold as a psychic apparatus, “command cen-
ter” or the like, for example, an agency that does and controls everything. Instead, 
this ego forms as a field-part—as part of the psychological field of experience and 
behavior—and abides by the same “laws of the whole” (i.e., Gestalt factors) as all 
the rest of the experiential and behavioral world.
This conception of the self in Gestalt theory viewing the ego as a field part besides 
and interrelated with other field parts appears quite unpretentious compared with 
much weightier conceptions of the ego as a powerful psychic apparatus and the 
like. This has prompted the Italian Gestalt psychologist Giuseppe Galli in later 
years to speak of a “narcissistic deflation” of this concept in Gestalt theory as op-
posed to the “narcissistic inflation of the ego” in other theories (Galli, 2005, 46).
But Wertheimer goes even further:
“Man is not only part of a field, but a part and member of his group. 
When people are together, as when they are at work, then the most unna-
tural behavior, which only appears in late stages or abnormal cases, would 
be to behave as separate Egos. Under normal circumstances they work in 
common, each a meaningfully functioning part of the whole. Consider 
South Sea Islanders working together, or children at play. An Ego standing 
vis a vis or in contrast to the others usually develops only under very spe-
cial circumstances.” (Wertheimer, 1924 in 1944, 92)
Wertheimer links this to the assumption:
“If for any outward or inner reasons a harmonious balance is not attaina-
ble between a person and the people with whom he lives, then definite 
disturbances of the equilibrium must appear and in extreme instances lead 
to precarious substitutes for the natural equilibrium which will transform 
the psychological structure of that person. This led to the hypothesis that 
a wide range of mental disease, for which no actual theory had previously 
been submitted, might be the consequence of such fundamental proces-
ses.” (ibid)
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This hypothesis has been elaborated in depth in the aforementioned treatise of the 
German psychiatrist Heinrich Schulte, under supervision of Max Wertheimer, on 
the origin and cure of a case of paranoid disorder (see Schulte, 1924 in 1986).
Thirdly, therefore: As far as the phenomenal ego in its phenomenal world is 
concerned, there are special relations of belonging and centering with regard to 
its fellow human beings. These fellow men are of particular importance for man 
in comparison to other issues and facts in his world; therefore humans (or shapes 
that resemble people) are particularly highlighted in everyday perception (even in 
the case where there are no humans: just think of the “man on the moon”)—man 
needs his fellowmen most essentially for his life and survival. These relations of 
belonging and centering in his phenomenal world are therefore in most cases the 
decisive factor for loosing and for regaining mental health.
7. Kurt Koffka on Ego and Self
Therefore, from the Gestalt theoretical point of view, the phenomenal ego is a 
field -part that is segregated from the phenomenal field. This field-part is more 
or less closely interrelated to all other parts of the field, as well as the field as a 
whole. Kurt Koffka systematically explained this concept in 1935 in his major 
work Principles of Gestalt Psychology (especially in chapter 8) and further elabo-
rated on it.
In a letter to his long-time collaborator Molly Harrower on March 24, 1933, 
Koffka already characterizes his ego-concept with four key statements:
“One: The phenomenal Ego and the phenomenal environment are a segre-
gated field part.
Two: When Ego disappears from the phenomenal world or consciousness 
ceases altogether, the need tensions within the Ego system survive.
Three: Therefore, the real, psycho-physical Ego is not identical with the phe-
nomenal Ego, but it is permanent. This persistence of the Ego is not memory 
in the usual sense, but comparable to the persistence of the real organism in 
the real environment. This makes a theory of personality possible.
Four: If the Ego as a segregated system persists independently of conscious-
ness, then the environment from which it is segregated must also persist 
independently of consciousness. Otherwise, there would be nothing to segre-
gate and unify the Ego system” (Harrower, 1983, 31f ).
According to Koffka (on this point heavily relying on Kurt Lewin), the phenome-
nal ego is made up of tension systems, which are in constant interaction with the 
environment. These tension systems owe their existence to the needs and quasi-
needs (a term Lewin uses for the conscious and non-conscious intentions) of peo-
ple. Depending on the possibilities of satisfying these needs and quasi-needs or of 
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finding some substitute satisfaction—these possibilities depending on what the 
environment has to offer but also on the personality structure and dynamics—the 
processes originating from these tension systems will eventually result in a relaxa-
tion of the subsystems in play, leading to a redistribution of tension in the entire 
system (see Lindorfer & Stemberger, 2012; Lindorfer, 2021).
Thus, this constant process of satisfaction, partial satisfaction, substitute-satisfaction, 
or non-satisfaction of needs and quasi needs is accompanied by a constant change in 
the tension systems that make up the ego in its relationship with its environment. 
In this interaction, necessarily there must be constant changes in the field part ego 
just as changes in the surrounding field parts.
But there is not only variability in these processes; there is also a certain constancy 
of structural and dynamic characteristics which is reflected in the experience of 
identity of oneself and of the world over time. Therefore, as far as the ego is con-
cerned, we are dealing according to Koffka on one hand with various temporary 
sub-systems of the ego, on the other with a relatively enduring subsystem of the 
ego, a core-ego, which is now referred to as the “Self ” by Koffka:
“The sub-systems do not simply exist side by side; they are organized in 
various ways. One principle of organization is that of surface-depth orga-
nization. The Ego has a core, the Self, and enveloping this core, in various 
communications with it and each other, are other sub-systems, compara-
ble to different layers, until we come to the surface, which is most easily 
touched, and most easily discharged. Another principle of organization 
concerns the communication between the different systems, a third relati-
ve dominance.” (Koffka, 1935, 342)
8. Koffka on the Internal Structure of the Ego
Koffka discusses in detail the question as to what conditions determine the se-
gregation of a phenomenal ego as a separate field-part within the phenomenal 
total field. He presents the case of an Austrian mountaineer who fell in a crevasse, 
losing consciousness, and then only gradually awakening from unconsciousness. 
This mountaineer described afterward how there was first no ego at all and how 
then an ego came into existence during this process. From the description of this 
process Koffka concludes that the body perceptions of primarily proprioceptive 
nature seem to have played a decisive role in this case for the segregation of 
a phenomenal ego from the rest of the phenomenal field. These body percep-
tions brought sufficient non-homogeneity into the originally homogeneous field. 
Following certain Gestalt principles (especially the factors of proximity, simila-
rity, and common fate), these body perceptions enabled the fusion of a region 
of the field as sufficiently different from the rest of the field. Thus, they brought 
about the collapse of the first unified field in a bi-polar field, having the two 
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poles ego and non-ego. One pole—forming the “core of the self ”—attracts all 
the bodily experiences and gives rise to the emergence of a bodily ego while the 
auditory and visual experiences remain on the “external pole” and thus belong to 
the environment part of the field.
“How this point-core itself was formed, we do not know. It must have had 
a great deal to do with the victim’s earlier Ego [Koffka is talking about the 
mountain climber fallen in the crevasse], his wishes, fears, determinations, 
which are now brought into play.” (Koffka, 1935, 324f )
In 1936 Koffka writes to Harrower again on this topic:
“What factors are responsible for Ego organization? What kind of proper-
ties must processes have in order to operate in the Ego? From this point of 
view the normal and pathological case is equally in need of explanation.... 
We do not necessarily have to search for Intra Ego forces but may envisage 
the whole structure of the person’s mind, including both Ego and Envi-
ronment processes, and looking for special characteristics in either field.” 
(Harrower, 1983, 127f )
This shows that Koffka considers it important to deal also with the internal struc-
ture of the ego whose core he addresses as the self. This subsystem “self ” is charac-
terized according to Koffka by much stronger stresses than the other (temporary) 
subsystems of the ego: He thinks that the reason for this is that these stresses 
correspond to real needs, as opposed to the tensions of quasi-needs which arise 
from more superficial and temporary intentions (Koffka, 1935, 342).
As an example of the dynamic importance of the internal structure of the ego, 
Koffka refers to the Berlin experiments of Kurt Lewin and his students, especially 
to the work of Bluma Zeigarnik (1927):
“For an ambitious person to miss the solution of a problem means ‘failure’, 
means that the achievement has fallen below his ‘personal standard’, means 
therefore a definite affection of that part of the Ego system which we shall 
now call the ‘self ’.” (Koffka, 1935, 341).
9. Köhler: Small Objection, Big Approval
Wolfgang Köhler’s views differ only slightly from those of Koffka. Only in one 
point does he announce objection (see Luchins, 1961, 21); while Koffka nor-
mally situates the thoughts of the person in the ego (1935, 327–329), Köhler 
cautions against regarding thoughts or thoughts objects as part of the pheno-
menal ego—this would result in leaving strictly phenomenological grounds and 
would invite “a most unfortunate vagueness in the use of the term self ” (Köhler, 
1938, 90; see there also Footnote 2 on Koffka).
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Except for this difference Köhler shares the arguments put forward in Koffka’s 
ego-theory in all of its main points. Koffka reports in a further letter to Harrower 
on 06/15/1933 that he had many good talks with Köhler, and “he agrees with 
my Ego Theory completely. It did not even seem to be new to him. He finds it 
as necessary a conclusion as I did, which gave me great satisfaction.” (Harrower, 
1983, 11)
Köhler also shared Koffka’s beliefs that the phenomenal ego and its phenomenal 
environment correspond to a neural ego as well as a neural environment in the 
brain processes, which may in turn account for even just part of the whole brain 
activity. This aspect is related to the important question, of how to explain how 
something apparently from my phenomenal ego and also something from my 
phenomenal environment seems to have a continuing existence even when my 
self-awareness and my world-awareness are interrupted (in sleep or in uncon-
sciousness)—after waking my phenomenal ego and my phenomenal environment 
are available again, as if there had not been any interruption of my awareness. This 
conception of a neural correlate of the phenomenal ego and a neural correlate of 
its phenomenal environment Köhler himself addresses in 1938 as follows:
“Although many sources contribute to its make-up, the ‘subjective’ part of 
the phenomenal field, including the emotional life, the kinesthetic and the 
visual components of the self, represents under normal conditions a unit 
which as such has commerce with the ‘objective’ world. We are thus forced 
to postulate a similarly intimate organization and centralization of all the 
neural events which underlie the phenomenal self. And as the phenomenal 
self generally represents one entity in its commerce with the ‘objective’ 
world, so its complex neural correlate will behave as a unit in its functional 
relations with the correlates of ‘objective’ percepts.” (Köhler, 1938, 354)
10. Lewin on the Internal Structure of the Ego
Similar to Koffka, Lewin goes after the issue of internal differentiation or internal 
structure of the ego, as well as its role in relation to the environment. However, 
Lewin uses a slightly different terminology than Koffka. Where Koffka speaks of 
the “self,” Lewin speaks of an “inner core of personality,” of “inner regions of the 
soul” and “intra-psychic systems,” of “deep layers” and terms alike. So Lewin and 
his students take a topological perspective, the viewpoint of the spatial internal 
structure of the person. As we have seen, we find this perspective also in Koffka’s 
writings where he speaks of surface and depth, layers and core, etc.
Lewin represents in any case the
“view that a special region, within the psychical totality, must be defined 
as the self in the narrower sense. Not every psychically existent system 
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would belong to this central self. Not everyone to whom I say ‘Du,’ not 
all the things, men, and environmental regions which I know and which 
may perhaps be very important to me, belong to my self. This self-system 
would also have in functional respects – this is most important – a certain 
unique position. Not every tense psychical system would stand in com-
munication with this self. Tensions which have to do with the self would 
also have functionally a special significance in the total psychical organism 
(…), and it is possible that within this region differently directed tensions 
would tend to equilibrium considerably more strongly and that relatively 
isolated dynamic systems within it could much less readily occur.” (Lewin, 
1935, 61f )
In this context, Lewin and his students speak of “intra-psychic districts” or “in-
trapsychic systems” (Dembo, 1931 in 1976, 405), further of an “inner core of 
personality” (“Ich-Kern”) within the “deeper layers” of the person (see Figure 4):
Fig. 4. Lewin’s “inner core of personality” (Dembo, 1931 in 1976, 406, Figure 17).
These more central layers of the ego-core are usually “functionally enclosed.” In 
certain situations, however, with increasing affectivity stresses can break though 
to these deeper layers of the person (see Dembo, 1931 in 1976, 407).
Ferdinand Hoppe, another student of Lewin, further elaborates on the dynamic 
importance of the internal structure of the ego, describing the dynamic relation-
ship of the ego-core (the “central I”) and the levels of aspiration (Hoppe, 1930 in 
1976, 482f ). In this context, Hoppe forms the concept of “ego levels” for the self-
worth (ibid, 481, 483–485). According to him, there is a dynamic relationship 
between the level of aspiration for the particular task at hand and an ego-level, 
which goes beyond the single task and on which one’s own person as a social 
being is based (ibid, 483; see also the dynamics of the ego-level, the trend to keep 
it as high as possible, 484).
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11. Mary Henle: The Self as a System of Related Functions
The American Gestalt psychologist Mary Henle, the most important collaborator 
of Wolfgang Köhler in the USA, draws attention to a further important aspect. 
She sees in the self a system of closely related functions:
“The most obvious fact about the self as we experience it is the multipli-
city of aspects it presents. We do not ordinarily appear to ourselves as an 
undifferentiated ‘I’.” (Henle, 1962, 396). And: “It seems that even when 
we confine ourselves to what is phenomenally present, the self consists of 
a variety of functions. […] Although we often tend to personify them, 
actually they are functions, not entities.” (ibid, 397)
Further, Henle gives the following examples for such functions: observing and 
acting, criticizing, accepting or rejecting, [the inner friend: comforting, encoura-
ging], Protecting/adorning/embellishing, realistically assessing/imagining, drea-
ming... (see for more details Henle, 1962).
On the relationship between the various aspects of self Henle says: “… although 
conflicts are experiences, as in some of the examples given above, these experien-
tially distinct aspects of the self work together, on the whole, in an organized man-
ner, with reference to each other if not always in harmony.” (Henle, 1962, 400)
Here one can see a bridge connecting Henle’s and Koffka’s thinking: Koffka had 
found that the body perceptions of a primarily proprioceptive nature play a de-
cisive role for the segregation of the phenomenal bodily ego from the rest of the 
phenomenal field. In line with this, one can proceed, including Henle’s reflec-
tions on the functions of the self:
For his orientation and ability to act in the world, in particular in his co-
human environment, man does not need only “outward directed sense 
organs” and “intra-corporeal senses,” but also functions like a permanent 
self-reflection, self-examination and self-care, directed towards his phe-
nomenal ego in its identity and in its relationship with its environment. 
These functions in the ego-region of the field are of paramount importance 
for the “fine-tuning” of the phenomenal world as a “central steering organ” 
(Metzger), especially for all human interactions in life. Henle gives some 
examples which point in this direction in her references to the correlation 
between self-criticism and response to “external” criticism or on the re-
lationship between self-acceptance (being one’s own “inner friend”) and 
having “outer” friends.
12. Edwin Rausch: Multiple Egos—Multiple Fields
At least briefly, reference must be made here to Edwin Rausch’s research on the 
multiplicity of the ego in perception. Henle’s findings have a complement in the 
function of the multi-field division of the phenomenal world, as we find it in a 
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considerably large part of the waking life of man. As Edwin Rausch has found 
out in his experimental research (Rausch, 1982), it comes to the formation of a 
second ego with its own phenomenal environment, if in one’s primary world of 
experience circumstances occur, which are not compatible in one and the same 
world (an effect of the Prägnanz tendency). This is subsequently connected with 
a sometimes closer, sometimes looser interdependence and interaction between 
these two total fields and thus also between the two phenomenal egos. The rela-
tions between the ego in the primary total field and the ego in the secondary total 
field can show many of Henle’s functions of the ego “in action.” For example, the 
ego in the secondary total field of a wish-fulfilling daydream or in co-experiencing 
with the hero in a film or novel may be the ego that the ego in the primary total 
field could not stand up to its own criticism. Or it may be already the decisive 
condition for the segregation of the second total field that one discovers the ex-
perience of another own ego, which cannot be reconciled in one and the same 
world—at least not immediately and only the interaction between the two egos 
in the primary and secondary total field makes their later unification possible.
I can only hint at these connections here and refer to the more extensive 
Gestalt-theoretical literature on the multiple-field approach (Stemberger, 2009, 
2018, 2021).
13. Metzger’s Differentiation of Self-Awareness
Going forward with these considerations one might find helpful what Wolfgang 
Metzger says about the differentiation of the phenomenal world from the view-
point of one’s awareness: He distinguishes between self-awareness, awareness of 
one’s “inner world,” and awareness of one’s “outer world”:
“1. Self-awareness is to be understood as the awareness of the phenomenal, 
experienced ego (...). Awareness in this sense comprises in first place the 
simple awareness of one’s own existence; secondly an already somewhat 
more differentiated awareness of one’s state of mind; and finally, the very 
slowly developing awareness of one’s own uniqueness, an awareness of 
one’s enduring personality in its specificity, in being different from others, 
this being the true subject of self-knowledge (...).
The actual and unquestionable core of self-perception is certainly the awa-
reness of one’s state of mind: as the awareness of how one is at this mo-
ment, in what mood one is, what one ‘feels like’; in other words: the whole 
world of moods, feelings, emotions and affects, intentions and aspirations, 
as one experiences and feels them directly in himself. (...)
2 and 3. The two remaining areas of awareness or of the phenomenal world 
are best understood in their mutual stand-off. They are, as I have said, the 
inner-world consciousness, for the contents of which I have suggested the 
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expression ‘the envisioned,’ (das Vorgestellte) and the outer-world con-
sciousness, for the contents of which the expressions ‘the encountered’ (das 
Angetroffene) or ‘the encountering’ (das Begegnende) seem to me most 
appropriate.” (Metzger, 1959, transl. from German)
14. Galli: Forms of Prägnanz in the Ego-World-Relationship
Finally, the contribution of the Italian Gestalt psychologist Giuseppe Galli must 
be addressed. He has devoted a significant part of his life to the research of the 
phenomenal self. In one of his major works, the Psychologie der sozialen Tugenden 
(psychology of social virtues; Galli, 2005), he discusses the phenomenology and 
dynamics of various social behaviors, or “modes of being together.” This can be un-
derstood as Gestalt qualities of human relations or—as Galli himself proposes—as 
“Forms of Prägnanz of relationship structures” (Galli, 2010, 58ff).
Galli explicates this in dealing with the “social virtues” of dedication, of gratitude, 
of wonder, of repentance and forgiveness, of trust, honesty, and hope. As Galli 
shows, these “virtues” are not properties or traits of a person, but specific forms of 
prägnant order of the psychological field, especially the structural and functional 
integration of the phenomenal ego in his interpersonal environment in concrete 
situations.
Galli continues with this analysis, what Max Wertheimer in his posthumously 
published work Productive Thinking tried to demonstrate with his examples “Two 
boys playing badminton” and “A young girl describes his office” (Wertheimer, 
1945/2020). Wertheimer as well as Galli try to understand the structure and 
dynamics of the field, what factors determine the behavior of the phenomenal 
ego in his phenomenal world, in particular in relation to his fellow men. So here 
we come full circle again in our brief review of Gestalt theoretical approaches to 
ego and self.
Summary
The paper presents basic Gestalt theoretical concepts of ego and self. They differ from 
other concepts in the way that they do not comprehend ego and self as fixed entities 
or as central controlling instances of the psyche, but as one specific organized unit in a 
psychological field in dynamic interrelation with the other organized units—the environ-
ment units—of this field. On this theme, well-known representatives of Gestalt theory 
have presented some general and special theories since the early days of this approach that 
could partly be substantiated experimentally. They illuminate the relationship between 
ego and world in everyday life as well as in the case of mental disorders. Not only the 
spatial extension of the phenomenal ego is subject to situational changes, but also its place 
in the world, its functional fitting in this world, its internal differentiation, its perme-
ability to the environment, and much more. The German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang 
Metzger emphasizes the significant functional role that this dynamic plasticity of the 
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phenomenal world and its continuously changing segregation of ego and environment 
have for human life by designating the phenomenal world as a “Central Steering Mecha-
nism.” In this article, ego and self as part of this field in their interrelation with the total 
psychological field will be illuminated from the perspective of the thinking of the Gestalt 
psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang 
Metzger, Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch, and Giuseppe Galli.
Keywords: ego and self, Gestalt psychology, critical realism, psychophysics, embodiment, 
Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy.
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag stellt grundlegende gestalttheoretische Auffassungen von Ich und Selbst vor. 
Sie unterscheiden sich von anderen Konzepten darin, dass sie Ich und Selbst nicht als fest-
stehende Gegebenheiten oder als steuernde Zentralinstanzen des Psychischen verstehen, 
sondern als Teil eines psychologischen Feldes in dynamischer Wechselbeziehung zu ihrer 
psychologischen Umwelt. Zu diesem Thema haben namhafte Vertreter der Gestalttheorie 
seit der Frühzeit dieses Ansatzes einige allgemeine und spezielle Thesen vorgelegt, die zum 
Teil auch experimentell belegt werden konnten. Sie beleuchten das Ich-Welt-Verhältnis 
im Alltäglichen wie auch im Fall von psychischen Störungen. Situativen Veränderungen 
unterworfen ist schon die Ausdehnung des phänomenalen Ich, aber auch sein Ort in 
der Welt, seine funktionale Einpassung, seine Binnendifferenzierung, seine Durchlässig-
keit zur Umwelt und vieles mehr. Die bedeutende funktionale Rolle dieser Plastizität 
der phänomenalen Welt in ihrer wechselnden Ich-Umwelt-Gliederung für das Leben der 
Menschen hebt Wolfgang Metzger hervor, indem er die anschauliche Welt als “zentrales 
Steuerungsorgan” bezeichnet. Ich und Selbst als Teile dieses Feldes in ihrer Wechselbezie-
hung zum psychischen Gesamtfeld werden im vorliegenden Beitrag aus der Perspektive 
von Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Metzger, 
Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch und Giuseppe Galli beleuchtet.
Schlüsselwörter: Ich und Selbst, Gestaltpsychologie, Kritischer Realismus, Psycho-
physik, embodiment, Gestalttheoretische Psychotherapie.
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